A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games

Abderrahmane Ziad, Samir Sbabou and Cemoi Hatem SMAOUI
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Samir Sbabou: University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM (UMR CNRS)
Cemoi Hatem SMAOUI: Université de la Réunion

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: This paper provides a simple formula describing all Nash equilibria in symmetric monotone singleton congestion games. Our approach also yields a new and short proof establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this kind of congestion games without invoking the potential function or the nite improvement property.

Keywords: Singleton congestion games; Nash equilibria; Potential function; Finite improvement property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Related works:
Journal Article: A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games (2013)
Working Paper: A formula for Nash equilibria in monotone singleton congestion games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tut:cremwp:201114

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