On Cournot Markets
Daniel Danau () and
Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS
This paper focuses on the existence of a Cournot equilibrium in a n- firm Cournot market for a single homogeneous commodity. Using a simple argument and proof, it shows that a Cournot equilibrium exists if each firm's marginal revenue declines with its own output and some weak non-decreasing incremental cost condition is satisfied.
Keywords: Cournot Competition; existence of Cournot equilibrium; supermodular games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tut:cremwp:201219
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