Union Membership does not pay: Evidence from recent French Micro Data

Mathieu Bunel and Gilles Raveaud
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Gilles Raveaud: Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Université Paris 8 Saint-Denis

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: We used a French employer–employee representative survey to estimate, within private firms covered by union contracts, the union member wage premium. Our estimates are based on several methods: ordinary least squares with averaged individual characteristics at the workplace level, the propensity score and separated equations. We found no wage penalty for free riders, except for blue collar and office workers. But even for these workers, the estimated wage premium is very small. Globally, in France, union membership does not seem to be motivated by monetary raisons. This situation could explain the low level of union membership observed.

Keywords: Union wage premium; union membership; employer-employee data; propensity score method; separated equations method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-lab and nep-lma
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