Do bankers ration more credit?

Sylvie Cieply
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Sylvie Cieply: Normandie University, Caen, Institut Banque-Assurance - CREM CNRS UMR6211, France

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: Has credit rationing increased in France for twelve years? The hypothesis of an increase in credit rationing to French firms is very often postponed by observers. This article looks for an answer by comparing the results of surveys carried out in 2000 and 20012 on a sample of bankers specialized in the financing of firms. The results given by the new survey confirm the fundamental result of a strong credit rationing (total refusal) which is limited to new customers although weak credit rationing (restrictive quantity) is used to regulate the credit market as soon as a relationship between bank and firm is established. However we show that both strong and weak credit rationing are significantly less used by bankers and that they more frequently introduce collaterals and covenants when they give credit.

Keywords: Credit rationing; Collaterals; Covenants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
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