Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions: The Case of Two Resources, Computation and Algorithms. First version

Fatima Khanchouche, Samir Sbabou, Hatem Smaoui and Abderrahmane Ziad
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Fatima Khanchouche: Department of Mathematics, Laboratory of Fundamental and Numerical Mathematics, Faculty of Sciences, University of Ferhat Abbas, Setif-1, Algeria
Samir Sbabou: CNRS, CREM - UNICAEN - University of Caen Normandy - NU - Normandy University, France
Hatem Smaoui: Center of Economics and Management of the Indian Ocean, University of La Réunion

Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) from Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS

Abstract: We study the class of congestion games with player-specic payoff functions Milchtaich (1996). Focusing on a case where the number of resources is equal to two, we give a short and simple method for identifying the exact number of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We propose an algorithmic method, first to find one or more Nash equilibria; second, to compare the optimal Nash equilibrium, in which the social cost is minimized, with the worst Nash equilibrium, in which the converse is true; third, to identify the time associated to the computations when the number of players increases.

Keywords: Congestions games; Nash equilibria computations; price of anarchy; price of stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth and nep-mic
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