Hidden Symmetries and Focal Points

Carlos Al�s Ferrer and Christoph Kuzmics
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carlos Alós-Ferrer

No 35, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: This paper provides a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of alternative symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand. We also clarify the difference between different concepts of symmetry used in the literature.

Keywords: symmetry; focal points; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Hidden symmetries and focal points (2013)
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