Hidden Symmetries and Focal Points
Carlos Alï¿½s Ferrer and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carlos Alós-Ferrer
No 35, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, UniversitÃ¤t Konstanz
This paper provides a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of alternative symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand. We also clarify the difference between different concepts of symmetry used in the literature.
Keywords: symmetry; focal points; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Hidden symmetries and focal points (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0035
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