Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?
Gerald Eisenkopf and
No 63, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, UniversitÃ¤t Konstanz
Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and the delegate, we find that the trusteeï¿½s rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who actually decides gets a higher reward. Delegation only pays off for the initial decision maker if the value of the delegateï¿½s transfer is much higher than the value of the investors transfer.
Keywords: Delegation; trust; reciprocity; intentions; exeriment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Doing Well by doing good - or doing better by delegating? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0063
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