Sharing an increase of the rent fairly

Rodrigo Velez

No 20151201-001, Working Papers from Texas A&M University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We characterize the family of non-contestable budget- monotone rules for the allocation of objects and money as those obtained by maximizing a min social welfare function among all non-contestable allocations. We provide three additional seemingly independent approaches to construct these rules. We present three applications of this characterization. First, we show that one can "rectify" any non-contestable rule without losing non-contestability. Second, we characterize the preferences that admit, for each budget, a non-contestable allocation satisfying a minimal or maximal individual consumption of money constraint. Third, we study continuity properties of the non-contestable correspondence.

Keywords: solidarity; allocation of objects and money; non contestable allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2015-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing an increase of the rent fairly (2017)
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