Inequity-averse preferences in general equilibrium

Rodrigo Velez

No 20160111-001, Working Papers from Texas A&M University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the stability with respect to the introduction of opportunity-based inequity aversion a la Dufwenberg et. al (2011) of three welfare properties satisfied by competitive equilibria in self-regarding economies: (i) Pareto efficiency may not be a stable property; (ii) undomination with respect to income redistribution is a stable property whenever the marginal indirect utility of income has no extreme variations; and (iii) generically (endowment-wise) market-constrained efficiency is a stable property.

Keywords: inequity aversion; general equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2016-01-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Inequity-averse preferences in general equilibrium (2017)
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