Behavioral Regulatory Agencies

Francesc Trillas Jané ()
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Francesc Trillas Jané: Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

Working Papers from Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona

Abstract: This article analyses how the commitment problem in regulation, and the potential for a strategic delegation solution, is affected by the consideration of bounded rationality by agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. Regulators and other agents have endogenous preferences. Non-optimizing behavior, expert biases (and related de-biasing strategies), and a concern for fairness and process also modify the traditional regulatory game. As a result, on the one hand independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust regulatory system, and on the other hand their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments.

Keywords: bounded rationality; regulation; commitment; delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2016-05
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