An Exploration of the Content of Social Norms using Simple Games
Raúl López-Pérez and
Marc Vorsatz ()
No 2010/01, Working Papers in Economic Theory from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History)
The literature on social norms stresses that compliance with norms is approved while deviance is disapproved. Based on this, we explore the content of social norms using experimental data from five dictator games with a feedback stage. Our data suggests that subjects either care about a reciprocity or an efficiency norm.
Keywords: approval; disapproval; dictator game; experiment; social Norms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-neu and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uam:wpaper:201001
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