Individual Heterogeneity in Punishment and Reward
Andreas Leibbrandt () and
No 2011/01, Working Papers in Economic Theory from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History)
We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their motivations behind costly punishment and rewarding. Our findings qualify existing evidence and suggest that the largest fraction of players is motivated by a mixture of both inequity-aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequity-aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provide new insights into the literature on other-regarding preferences and may help to reconcile important phenomena reported in the experimental literature on punishment and reward.
Keywords: Heterogeneity; inequity aversion; monetary punishment/reward; reciprocity; social norms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-soc and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uam:wpaper:201101
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