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Assortative Marriage and the Effects of Government Homecare Subsidy Programs on Gender Wage and Participation Inequality

David Bjerk () and Seungjin Han working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: We develop a model of the labor market where firms incur an adjustment cost when one of their workers quits, and males and females form households assortatively by skill. We show how this environment can lead to an economy where females earn less and drop out more frequently than equally skilled males in equilibrium, even when males and females constitute ex-ante identical populations. We then examine how different government homecare subsidy schemes may affect such gender inequality in the labor market. We show that the effect of government homecare subsidy schemes on gender inequality depends crucially on the form in which the subsidy is given and to whom it is allocated.

Keywords: Gender Inequality; Discrimination; Subsidized Childcare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 H42 J13 J16 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2005-11-21, Revised 2006-09-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-pbe
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Journal Article: Assortative marriage and the effects of government homecare subsidy programs on gender wage and participation inequality (2007) Downloads
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