Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting
Seungjin Han ()
Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics
This paper studies the bilateral contracting environment where multiple principals negotiate contracts with multiple agents independently. It is shown that equilibrium allocations associated with (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of negotiation schemes can be supported by pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to the set of menus. It is also shown that equilibrium allocations associated with all perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of negotiation schemes can be supported by correlated equilibria relative to the set of menus, where the set of states is simply the set of feasible probability distributions over payoff-relevant variables. Moreover, equilibrium allocations associated with all equilibria relative to the set of menus persist even if principals use more complex negotiation schemes.
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Bilateral Contracting; Mutliple Principals; Multiple Agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2004-01-29, Revised 2004-01-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Menu theorems for bilateral contracting (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:han-04-01-29-10-05-13
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