Definable and Contractible Contracts

Michael Peters () and Balazs Szentes

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of the other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. This is accomplished by constructing contracts which are definable functions of the Godel code of every other player's contract. We provide a complete characterization of the set of allocations supportable as pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium of this contracting game. When information is complete, this characterization provides a folk theorem. In general, the set of supportable allocations is smaller than the set supportable by a centralized mechanism designer.

Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2009-01-22, Revised 2010-05-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://montoya.econ.ubc.ca/mike/folk_theorem.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden (http://montoya.econ.ubc.ca/mike/folk_theorem.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://montoya.econ.ubc.ca/mike/folk_theorem.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Definable and Contractible Contracts (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2009-7

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maureen Chin ().