An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods

Hanming Fang and Peter Norman ()

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents\' valuations are private information. For a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we characterize the optimal mechanism, and show that it involves bundling. Bundling alleviates the free riding problem in large economies in two ways: first, it can increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one; second, it decreases the extent of use exclusions.

Keywords: Bundling; Public Good Provision; Exclusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2004-11-21, Revised 2005-02-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/pnorman/Research/restudefficiencyrationale.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: An Efficiency Rational for Bundling of Public Goods (2004)
Working Paper: An Efficiency Rationale for the Bundling of Public Goods (2004)
Working Paper: An efficiency rationale for bundling of public goods (2003)
Working Paper: An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:norman-04-11-21-09-39-13

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maureen Chin ().