Overcoming Participation Constraints

Hanming Fang and Peter Norman ()

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: In incomplete information environments with transferable utility, efficient outcomes are generally implementable unless interim or ex post participation constraints are imposed on the problem. In this paper we show that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but possibly unrelated social decisions, a slightly perturbed Groves mechanism can implement an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, while respecting all participation, incentive and balanced budget constraints.

Keywords: Linking; Approximate Efficiency; Groves Mechanism; Participation Constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2005-04-22, Revised 2005-04-28
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Overcoming Participation Constraints (2006)
Working Paper: Overcoming Participation Constraints (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:norman-05-04-22-05-35-30

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