Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents

Michael Peters ()

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents.

Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2003-12-17, Revised 2004-02-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-03-12-17-12-42-59

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