The Pre-Marital Investment Game

Michael Peters ()

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large. It is shown that mixed Nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much.

Keywords: human capital; pre-marital investment; assortative matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2004-02-18, Revised 2006-09-13
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Related works:
Journal Article: The pre-marital investment game (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-04-02-18-01-42-09

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