The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum

Michael Peters ()

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: The paper proves existence of equilibrium in a fairly general version of the pre-marital investment game. The game has discontinuous payoffs, so the method of Reny (1999) is used. Three assumptions are imposed on the matching process that occurs after investments are realized. It must be assortative, it must resolve ties efficiently, and it must not allow externalities.

Keywords: pre-marital investment; assortative matching; equilibrium in discontinuous games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2005-12-16, Revised 2006-03-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-05-12-16-12-42-35

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