Asymmetric First-Price Menu Auctions under Intricate Uncertainty

Seungjin Han

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifi es a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus o ffered by sellers chooses the best contract. This paper establishes the existence of a continuum of separating monotone equilibria in this game bounded above by the jointly ex-post efficient outcome and below by the jointly interim efficient outcome. It shows that the jointly ex-post efficient equilibrium outcome is the only ex-post renegotiation proof outcome and it is also ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria

Keywords: first-price menu auction; interdependent values; monotone equilibria; joint ex-post renegotiation-proofness; ex-ante robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2011-05-25, Revised 2013-04-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:seungjin_han-2011-9

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