Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders

Winand Emons

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. Even if an agent is law abiding, she may still commit the act accidentally. The agents are wealth constrained. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. If the benefit from the crime is small, the optimal sanction scheme is decreasing in the number of offenses. In contrast, if the benefit is large, sanctions are increasing in the number of offenses. Increasing sanctions do not make the criminal track less attractive; they make being being honest more attractive

Keywords: crime and punishment; repeat offenders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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https://repec.vwiit.ch/dp/dp0315.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Escalating penalties for repeat offenders (2007)
Working Paper: Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders (2003)
Working Paper: Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders
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