Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees

Winand Emons

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgment; under conditional fees he gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers choose between a safe and a risky litigation strategy. Under conditional fees lawyers prefer the safe strategy, under contingent fess the risky one. Risk-averse plaintiffs prefer conditional fees over contingent fees when lawyering costs are low and vice versa for high lawyering costs

Keywords: contingent fees; conditional fees; risk aversion; insurance; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees (2006)
Working Paper: Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0419

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