 Cooperation preferences and framing effectsAur lie Dariel Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft Abstract: This paper presents the results from an experiment investigating whether framing affects the elicitation and predictive power of preferences for cooperation, i.e., the willingness to cooper- ate with others. Cooperation preferences are elicited in three treatments using the method of Fischbacher, G chter and Fehr (2001). The treatments vary two features of their method: the sequence and order in which the contributions of other group members are presented. The predictive power of the elicited preferences is evaluated in a one-shot and a finitely-repeated public-good game. I find that the order in which the contributions of others are presented, by and large, has no impact on the elicited preferences and their predictive power. In contrast, presenting the contributions of others in a sequence has a pronounced effect on the elicited preferences and reduces substantially their predictive power. Overall, elicited preferences are more accurate at predicting behavior when others' contributions are presented simultaneously and in ascending order, like in Fischbacher, G chter and Fehr (2001). Keywords: public-good game; strategy method; predictive power; framing effect (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1302 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft Contact information at EDIRC. |
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