Strategic Deviations in Optimal Monetary Policy
Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
This paper investigates the circumstances under which a central bank is more or less likely to deviate from the optimal monetary policy rule. The research questions is addressed in a simple New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which monetary policy deviations occur endogenously. The model solution suggests that higher future central bank credibility attenuates the current period policy trade-o between a stable in ation rate and a stable output gap. Together with the loss of credibility after a policy deviation, this provides the central bank with an incentive to implement past policy commitments. My main result shows that the central bank is willing to implement past policy commitments if a sucient fraction of agents is not aware of the exact end date of the policy commitment. This nding challenges the time-inconsistency argument against monetary policy commitments and provides a potential explanation for the repeated implementation of monetary policy commitments in reality.
Keywords: optimal monetary policy; strategic deviations; forward guidance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1817
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