Screening by Mode of Trade
Juan Beccuti () and
Marc Moeller
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marc Möller ()
Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
Abstract:
This paper proposes a mechanism design approach, capable of endogenizing a monopolist s choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable goods setting with short-term commitment. Allowing for mechanisms that determine the good s allocation not only at the beginning but also at the end of a given period, we show that the profit-maximizing mechanism features screening by mode of trade. By selling to high types while renting to low types, the monopolist overcomes the obstacles encountered by intertemporal price discrimination and induces immediate separation of types for arbitrary low priors.
Keywords: Durable goods; Dynamic mechanism design; Coase problem; Ratchet effect; Screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Screening by mode of trade (2021) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1908
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