Optimally Controlling an Epidemic
Dirk Niepelt and
Martin Gonzalez-Eiras
Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft
Abstract:
We propose a exible model of infectious dynamics with a single endogenous state variable and economic choices. We characterize equilibrium, optimal outcomes, static and dynamic externalities, and prove the following: (i) A lockdown generically is followed by policies to stimulate activity. (ii) Re-infection risk lowers the activity level chosen by the government early on and, for small static externalities, implies too cautious equilibrium steady-state activity. (iii) When a cure arrives deterministically, optimal policy is dis-continous, featuring a light/strict lockdown when the arrival date exceeds/falls short of a speci c value. Calibrated to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic the baseline model and a battery of robustness checks and extensions imply (iv) lockdowns for 3{4 months, with activity reductions by 25{40 percent, and (v) substantial welfare gains from optimal policy unless the government lacks instruments to stimulate activity after a lockdown.
Keywords: Epidemic; lockdown; forced opening; SIR model; SIS model; SI model; logistic model; COVID-19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimally Controlling an Epidemic (2020) 
Working Paper: Optimally Controlling an Epidemic (2020) 
Working Paper: Optimally Controlling an Epidemic (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2019
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