Startup Acquisitions: Acquihires and Talent Hoarding

Jean-Michel Benkert, Igor Letina, Shuo Liu

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: We study how competitive forces may drive firms to inefficiently acquire startup talent. In our model, two rival firms have the capacity to acquire and integrate a startup operating in a possibly orthogonal market. We show that firms may pursue such acquihires primarily as a preemptive strategy, even when these transactions appear unprofitable in isolation. Thus, acquihires, even absent traditional competition-reducing effects, need not be benign as they can lead to inefficient talent allocation. Additionally, our analysis underscores that such talent hoarding can diminish consumer surplus and exacerbate job volatility for acquihired employees.

Keywords: acquihire; talent hoarding; startup acquisition; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L41 M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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