Central Bank Digital Currency and Monetary Architecture

Dirk Niepelt

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: We review the macroeconomic literature on retail central bank digital currency (CBDC), organizing the discussion around a CBDC-irrelevance result. We identify both fundamental and policy-related sources of relevance, or departures from neutrality. Bank disintermediation - the crowding out of deposits - does not, by itself, constitute such a source. We argue that the literature has primarily focused on policy-related sources of non-neutrality, often without making this focus explicit. From a macroeconomic perspective, CBDC is, at its core, a matter of monetary architecture, and political economy considerations are central to understanding CBDC policy design.

Keywords: Monetary architecture; central bank digital currency; public money; private money; neutrality; lender of last resort. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E51 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mon and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2509

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