The Two-dimensional Model of Jury Decision Making
Manfred J. Holler
IEL Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
This paper discusses a two-dimensional jury model. It combines the idea of winning a maximum of votes in a voting game with utility maximization that derives from the winning proposition. The model assumes a first mover, the plaintiff, and a second-mover, the counsel of the defendant. Typically, these agents represent parties that have conflicting interests. Here they face a jury that consists of three groups of voters such that no single group has a majority of votes. Each group is characterized by homogeneous preferences on three alternatives that describe the possible outcomes. The outcome is selected by a simple majority of the jury members. The agents are interested in both gaining the support of a majority of jury members and seeing their preferred alternative selected as outcome. It will be demonstrated that equilibrium decision making can be derived for this model.
Keywords: Condorcet's Jury Theorem; Voting Paradox; majority cycle; aggregation of preferences; agenda setting; collective decision making. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucaiel:10
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