Examining the Efficiency of the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Pathologies and Prescriptions
Robert K. Christensen () and
John Szmer ()
IEL Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
Until recently (e.g., Lindquist 2007), few studies have examined the factors that might affect aspects of judicial efficiency, including the time it takes a court to decide a case. In our analysis of a sample o f U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions from 1971-1996, we examine a variety of potential causes of inefficiency, or pathologies, before suggesting a series of prescriptions. 1 Both authors equally contributed to this manuscript. The authors would like to thank Reese Manceaux for his assistance in merging a variety of seemingly incompatible databases, as well as Nicole Arnold for her assistance in collecting data.
Keywords: judicial efficiency; Courts of Appeals; litigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 K19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucaiel:4
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