Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kenneth S Rogoff () and
No C01-120, Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley
Abstract : It is well known that if international linkages are relatively small, the potential gains to international monetary policy coordination are typically quite limited. But what if goods and financial markets are tightly linked? Is it then problematic if countries unilaterally design their institutions for monetary stabilization? Are the stabilization gains from having separate currencies largely squandered in the absence of effective international monetary coordination? We argue that sunder plausible assumptions the answer is no. Unless risk aversion is very high, lack of coordination in rule setting is a second-order problem compared to the overall gains from monetary policy stabilization.
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Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules (2003)
Journal Article: Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules (2002)
Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules (2001)
Working Paper: Global Implications of Self-Orientated National Monetary Rules (2001)
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