Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule

Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen von Hagen.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juergen von Hagen and Barry Eichengreen

No C95-056, Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Abstract: The paper considers the case for fiscal restrictions like the Excessive Deficits Procedure of the Maastrict Treaty and the origin of borrowing restrictions in the U.S. and Australia

Date: 1995-09-01
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Working Paper: Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule (1995)
Working Paper: Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule (1995)
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