Dynamic Optimal Risk Management and Dividend Policy under Optimal Capital Structure and Maturity

Michael P. Ross.

No RPF-281, Research Program in Finance Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Abstract: This paper examines the interaction between a firm's volatility and dividend policies and capital structure and maturity policies. The firm is permitted to costlessly and continuously select any asset volatility and dividend yield, within bounds. Simple and intuitive rules are derived for the firm's optimal dividend and volatility choices. It is found that the firm always optimally selects either the maximal or minimal dividend yield and asset volatility and that these decisions depend, respectively, only upon the delta and gamma of the firm's equity. These optimal dividend and volatility policies are then implemented within the context of the Leland and Toft (1996) capital structure model. It is found that firms will optimally select a low dividend yield and a low asset volatility over a greater range of firm asset values the shorter is the maturity of the firm's debt. Anticipating this behavior, bondholders will demand a smaller credit spread for short-term debt when the firm has great leeway in choosing its asset volatility. In turn, this may induce a firm to optimally issue short-term debt. It is also found that the better is a firm's ability to hedge, the more frequently it will refrain from paying dividends. This confirms the well-known result that risk management mitigates incentives for underinvestment. Here it is shown to apply ex-post as well as ex-ante.

Date: 1998-07-01
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