Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets

Robert M. Anderson and Walter Trockel and Lin Zhou.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Walter Trockel and Lin Zhou

No 94-224, Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Abstract: In an nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the Mas- Colell bargaining set coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set, as well as a smaller bargaining set due to Zhou, may fail to converge to competitive outcomes in large finite NTU exchange economies.

Date: 1994-01-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets (1997)
Working Paper: Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets (1994)
Working Paper: Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets (1994)
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