An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft

Richard J. Gilbert and Michael L. Katz.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michael L. Katz () and Richard J. Gilbert

No E01-300, Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Abstract: We analyze the central economic issues raised by U.S. v Microsoft. Network effects and economies of scale in applications programs created a barrier to entry for new operating system competitors, which the combination of Netscape Navigator and the Java programming language potentially could have lowered. Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case.

Date: 2001-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent, nep-net and nep-tid
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Journal Article: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft (2001)
Working Paper: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v Microsoft (2001)
Working Paper: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft (2001)
Working Paper: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v Microsoft (2001)
Working Paper: An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft (2001)
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