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Subordinate Resolution - An Empirical Analysis of European Union Subsidiary Banks

Thomas Conlon () and John Cotter ()

No 201501, Working Papers from Geary Institute, University College Dublin

Abstract: To help curtail future sovereign exposures to banking losses, the European Union introduced the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive, which mandates bail-in of creditors in the event of significant bank losses. In this paper, we examine the impact of resolution on subsidiary banks, notable in terms of their substantial role throughout the European Union. Significant differences in risk and funding characteristics are apparent between domestic and cross-border European bank subsidiaries. Subsidiary banks are found to possess a larger proportion of loss absorbing capacity than underlying parent banks. Results indicate the suitability of single point of entry resolution in the case of domestic subsidiaries and multiple points of entry resolution for cross-border subsidiaries. Our findings highlight a worrying decline in loss absorbing capacity in European banks more generally since 2006, pointing to a necessary future focus on broad capital thresholds to ensure the success of the resolution model.

Keywords: Resolution Planning; Bail-In; Bank Failure; Bank Subsidiaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2015-02-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-eec
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http://www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/workingpapers/gearywp201501.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Subordinate Resolution ‐‐ An Empirical Analysis of European Union Subsidiary Banks (2019) Downloads
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