Some results on stability concepts for matching models

Ester Camiña

Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico

Abstract: We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.

Keywords: Matching; Assignment; Stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 12
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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