Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers

Carmelo Rodríguez à Lvarez ()
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Carmelo Rodríguez à Lvarez: ICAE Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico, Depto. Análisis Económico y Economía Cuantitativa, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez ()

No 2026-02, Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico

Abstract: We study social choice functions that select sets of alternatives, taking voters' preferences over sets as input, when voters evaluate sets according to conditional expected utility obtained from Bayesian updating of a prior. Barberà et al. (2001) shows that under a uniform common prior both dictatorial and bidictatorial rules satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity. We show that this multiplicity is a knife-edge case. If at most one voter holds a uniform initial prior, dictatorship is the unique rule satisfying these properties. The argument links set-valued rules to random dictatorship and shows that the probability ratios imposed by Bayesian updating from non-uniform priors are incompatible with combining the top choices of multiple voters.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Social choice functions over sets; Random dictatorship; Probability assessments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-mic
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/140346

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Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers (2025)
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