Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Ciara Whelan and Patrick Walsh ()

Open Access publications from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: Using survey data for 220 traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years of transition and 4 CEE countries, we find firms that produced for the EU market under planning consistently outperform those that produced for the CMEA market. Within the previously CMEA market, the best firms were selected to outside privatisation and outperformed insider/state owned firms. Outside privatisation was resisted in EU oriented firms and ownership was found to have no effect on performance. We argue that insider/state ownership in previously CMEA and EU markets builds up political support for the market system during its initial stages, ensuring its long-term success.

Keywords: Business enterprises--Europe, Eastern; Corporate governance; Privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/141 First version, 2000 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia (2001)
Working Paper: Firm Performance and the Political Economy of Corporate Governance: Survey Evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucn:oapubs:10197/141

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