Two-stage game models of international oligopoly

Dermot Leahy

No 199306, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: This paper reexamines the import protection as export promotion thesis in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and/or capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown that a tariff affects exports in two ways; firstly, if marginal cost is increasing, by raising home sales directly it crowds out exports; secondly by increasing R&D and/or capacity it raises exports indirectly. Prospects for export enhancing protection are compared for different games and shown to be better in the long run than in the short run.

Keywords: Foreign trade regulation--Econometric models; Foreign trade promotion--Econometric models; Import quotas--Econometric models; Oligopolies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-03
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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1710 First version, 1993 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucn:wpaper:199306

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