EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Foreign competition and wage inequality

J. Peter Neary

No 200102, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: I argue that increased foreign competition can affect technical choice and skill differentials even when actual imports do not rise significantly. I present a model of General Oligopolistic Equilibrium ("GOLE") in which a reduction in import barriers (whethe technological or policy-imposed) encourages more strategic investment by incumbent firms. The predictions accord with many of the stylised facts: higher skill premia; higher ratios of skilled to unskilled workers employed in all sectors and throughout the economy; little change in import volumes or prices; and rapid technological progress with rather little change in total factor productivity. (Presidential address to the International Economics and Finance Society, presented at the AEA/ASSA meetings, New Orleans, January 2001.)

Keywords: General Oligopolistic Equilibrium ("GOLE"); Skill premia; Skill-biased technical progress; Strategic investment; Trade and wages; Competition, International; Wage differentials; Competition, Imperfect; Labor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F16 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1270 First version, 2001 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Foreign Competition and Wage Inequality (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: Foreign Competition and Wage Inequality (2002) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200102

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nicolas Clifton ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200102