Strategic intellectual property protection policy and North-South technology transfer

Alireza Naghavi

No 200313, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: I analyze the welfare implications of protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) in developing countries through its impact on innovation, market structure, and technology transfer. FDI, tariffs, and joint ventures (JV) are introduced to the strategic IPR literature. In a North-South trade environment, the South sets the IPR policy strategically by anticipating the Northern firm’s R&D expenditure and multinationalization decision. A stringent IPR policy is always chosen in order to motivate technology transfer through FDI, which in turn improves welfare. JVs bring in more profits for the Southern firm, but FDI is the optimal form of transfer in terms of welfare.

Keywords: Intellectual property rights; Joint ventures; Multinational firms; Technology transfer; North-South trade; Intellectual property--Developing countries; Joint ventures--Developing countries; Investments, Foreign--Developing countries; Technology transfer--Developing countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F23 L11 L13 O32 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04
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