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Joint dominance and tacit collusion: An analysis of the irish vodafone/O2 case and the implications for competition and regulatory policy

Patrick Massey () and Moore McDowell

No 200805, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: The paper takes as its starting point the Irish telecom regulator ComReg’s finding of joint dominance by two firms in the mobile phone market in Ireland. The paper argues that the regulator’s decision was inconsistent with the facts in the case. However, it argues that the case raises wider questions about the whole concept of joint dominance as it has evolved under EU competition law which in our view is confused. We regard the approach of the ECJ in trying to use a single approach to joint dominance in merger analysis and in competition analysis as unjustified, misguided and at odds with economic analysis.

Keywords: Cellular telephone systems--Ireland; Telecommunication--Law and legislation--Ireland; Antitrust law--Ireland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/1344 First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

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