Comment on: Electoral Contests, incumbency advantages, and campaign finance
Ivan Pastine and
No 200913, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin
This paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implications are starkly different from the previously analyzed case where voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign spending. We find that a spending cap always favors the a priori popular candidate. This result holds irrespective of whether it is the incumbent or the challenger who is able to more effectively generate and spend contributions.
Keywords: Campaign finance reform; Spending limit; Expenditure limit; Incumbency advantage; Clean elections; Campaign funds; Political campaigns--Mathematical models; Voting research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/2611 First version, 2009 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucn:wpaper:200913
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