Public and Private Learning in the Market for Teachers: Evidence from the Adoption of Value-Added Measures

Michael Bates

No 201616, Working Papers from University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics

Abstract: Informational asymmetries between employers may inhibit optimal worker mobility. However, evidence is limited because researchers rarely observe shocks to employers' information. I exploit two school districts' adoptions of value-added (VA) measures of teacher effectiveness—informational shocks to some, but not all, employers—to provide direct tests of asymmetric employer learning. I develop a learning model and test its predictions for teacher mobility. I find that adopting VA increases within-district mobility of high-VA teachers, while low-VA teachers move out-of-district to uninformed principals. These patterns evidence asymmetric employer learning. This sorting from widespread VA adoption exacerbates inequality in access to effective teaching.

Keywords: asymmetric employer learning; value added; teachers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 I24 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 Pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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