Teacher labor market policy and the theory of the second best

Michael Bates, Michael Dinerstein (), Andrew Johnston and Isaac Sorkin
Additional contact information
Michael Dinerstein: University of Chicago

No 202312, Working Papers from University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics

Abstract: The teacher labor market is a two-sided matching market where the effects of policies depend on the actions of both sides. We specify a matching model of teachers and schools that we estimate with rich data on teachers’ applications and principals’ ratings. Both teachers’ and principals’ preferences deviate from those that would maximize the achievement of economically disadvantaged students: teachers prefer schools with fewer disadvantaged students, and principals’ ratings are weakly related to teacher effectiveness. In equilibrium, these two deviations combine to produce a surprisingly equitable current allocation where teacher quality is balanced across advantaged and disadvantaged students. To close academic achievement gaps, policies that address deviations on one side alone are ineffective or harmful, while policies that address both deviations could substantially increase disadvantaged students’ achievement.

Pages: 72 Pages
Date: 2023-01, Revised 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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https://economics.ucr.edu/repec/ucr/wpaper/202312.pdf First version, 2023 (application/pdf)
https://economics.ucr.edu/repec/ucr/wpaper/202312R.pdf Revised version, 2023 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Teacher Labor Market Policy and the Theory of the Second Best (2022)
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