Justice at What Cost? Penalties, Rape Deterrence, and the Incentive to Murder

Radhika Bansal () and Ugo Antonio Troiano ()
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Radhika Bansal: University of California Riverside
Ugo Antonio Troiano: Department of Economics, University of California Riverside

No 202516, Working Papers from University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics

Abstract: Increasing the penalties for a serious non-fatal crime can cost lives if the surviving victims serve as witnesses to secure the perpetrator’s conviction. In this article, we consider the case of laws against rape. We present a theoretical model to examine how increasing the penalty for one crime may lead the perpetrator to commit a collateral crime, thereby reducing the probability of conviction for the first crime. We then consider the cases of spousal rape laws and the mandatory minimum 25-year sentence for sex crimes against a child. Both treatments were introduced in the United States in a staggered fashion and increased the penalties for rape. Using difference-in-differences designs, we find that abolishing spousal rape exemptions increased wife homicides by approximately 5 victims per state-year (27 percent), while mandatory 25-year minimum sentences for child sexual abuse increased child homicides by approximately 11 victims per state-year (80 percent).

Keywords: rape; homicide; intimate partner violence; children; spousal. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 J16 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
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