Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation

Lanse Minkler () and Thomas Miceli

No 2002-36, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and some behave conditionally. Enhanced cooperation is a byproduct of integrity.

JEL-codes: A13 D00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation (2004)
Working Paper: Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-36

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