The Economics of Land Title Reform

Thomas Miceli and Joseph Kieyah

No 2003-02, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a model of land title reform which shows that a policy of voluntary adoption of a new system is not likely to be successful, even if the new system Pareto dominates the existing one. The problem is the existence of an externality that prevents individual landowners from fully internalizing the benefits of the new system. Some evidence for the theory is presented based on historic efforts to institute land registration in the United States and England. Implications are also drawn for ongoing attempts by developing countries to establish formal property rights systems for land as part of a policy to spur economic growth.

JEL-codes: K11 O17 Q15 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2002-10, Revised 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dev, nep-law, nep-res and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The economics of land title reform (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2003-02

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